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Abstract: In recent years, due to the proliferation of radio fre-
quency identification (RFID) technology in everyday life, espe-
cially in critical domains such as health care and transportation 
systems, significant efforts have been made to enhance the de-
pendability of this technology. From these efforts have emerged 
specific techniques and several middleware solutions to handle 
the large amount of the RFID data. These solutions are not suita-
ble for all RFID system requirements especially for issues related 
to critical domains. In this paper, we propose a novel fault-
tolerant RFID middleware providing two fault-tolerant mechan-
isms. The first mechanism is an online diagnosis algorithm based 
on a statistical analysis of the generated RFID data to identify 
faulty components of the system such as faulty readers or tags. 
The second mechanism is a verification process based on an 
extended finite state machine of the Low Level Reader Protocol 
(LLRP), the communication standard between RFID readers and 
RFID middleware. This process aims at identifying the causes of 
the diagnosed failures. 
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Few years ago, radio frequency identification (RFID) sys-
tems were only deployed in single site scenarios, usually with 
few readers. Nowadays, this kind of architecture is not suitable 
for the new user business needs, such as data sharing with 
partner companies [1]. To meet these new requirements, a 
novel type of software artifact, called RFID middleware, has 
been designed for managing the various RFID sources and for 
processing the huge volume of generated raw data. Despite the 
technological advances in the radio frequency domain, RFID 
systems are still unreliable and very sensitive to their running 
environment. For example, the read rate of current RFID read-
ers in real world deployments is often in the 60-70% 
range[2][3][4][5][6]. This means that for every 100 tag read-
ing attempts, almost 70 of them succeed. Thus, it becomes 
crucial to design a middleware able to monitor and to diagnose 
RFID systems in addition to their usual features. But most 
existing fault-tolerant mechanisms allow only monitoring one 
reader at a time [7] (instead of considering the whole RFID 
system with all its readers) and are no longer suitable for the 
new RFID systems that are deployed in multiple sites scena-
rios with many readers connected together. Indeed, “not con-
sidering the whole system in the diagnosis process” usually 
leads to misdetection of some RFID failures. In addition, these 
monitoring mechanisms cannot locate the faulty component 
neither find the causes of the failure. 
In this paper, we are interested in proposing on-line testing 
and fault tolerance facilities for RFID middleware. The first 
objective is to detect and to locate faulty components regard-
ing the whole RFID system. Then, we focus on finding the 
causes of the detected failures. A RFID middleware called 
SafeRFID-MW regarding the research project name 
SAFERFID is designed to accommodate the proposed fault-
tolerant mechanisms. This article is an extended version of a 
conference paper [8] published at Int. Conf. on Software, 
Telecommunications and Computer Networks (Soft-
COM’2012). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents an overview of the RFID technology. Section III 
introduces some related work and the context of our research, 
followed by the presentation of the fault model in section IV. 
Sections V, VI and VII present the proposed middleware solu-
tion with its both diagnosis mechanisms. Finally, section VIII 
presents and discusses three different implementations of the 
proposed approach. 
 
II. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF A RFID SYSTEM 
 
A RFID system is a contactless technology for uniquely 
and remotely identifying items by using radio waves [1][9]. It 
is composed of three main layers: RFID devices with their 
drivers and air protocols, Middleware and User applications as 
shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig.1. RFID system architecture 
• The hardware layer consists of Tags and Readers and 
their low level software. 
- Tags or transponders can be passive (i.e., they get 
their energy from the signal of the reader and they 
use backscattering to communicate) or active (i.e., 
they use their own energy contained in a small bat-
tery to operate). The tags uniquely identify an ob-
ject as bar-codes do, and carry some useful infor-
mation about it such as date of manufacture, expiry 
date of the product, preparation tips, etc.  
- Readers are devices that read (resp., write) the data 
from (resp., to) the tag memories. 
 
• The middleware is the heart of RFID systems. It 
processes the raw data generated by RFID devices, 
translates them into business events (such as “Product 
ID = xxxx has arrived at the warehouse on 01/22/2013 at 
11:00 am, in an amount of 1000 units”) and dissemi-
nates these events to client or enterprise applications. 
The main functions of a RFID middleware are: 
- Filtering the huge amount of received raw data; re-
dundant or unnecessary data will be filtered. 
- Data dissemination; the middleware has to send 
exactly the requested information (neither more 
nor less) to the correct user application and it has 
to manage the privacy and security of the sent data 
(data access restrictions). 
- Data aggregation; all data of the same type or for 
the same application will be gathered to ease their 
diffusion. 
- Data interpretation; the middleware must know 
how to interpret the data for better management. 
- Management of the readers such as connection in-
itiation, read/write operations, etc. 
 
 
Fig.2. LLRP Runtime Operation 
 
RFID middleware communicates with the readers 
through an EPCglobal communication standard called 
Low Level Reader Protocol (LLRP). LLRP supports 
both main functions of a RFID reader, which are tag in-
ventory (i.e., the identification of all tags located in the 
reader field of view) and tag memory access as shown in 
Fig. 2. These two functions are provided by LLRP by us-
ing two XML based messages: Reader Operation Speci-
fication (ROSpec) and Access Specification (Access-
Spec). ROSpec has an identification number, a state 
(Disabled, Inactive or Active), a priority and a set of 
commands and parameters required by the reader to per-
form a correct inventory. AccessSpec has an identifica-
tion number, a state (Disabled or Active), a ROSpecID 
that specifies the corresponding ROSpec (i.e., ROSpec 
that will be responsible of triggering it), a set of condi-
tions (TagSpec) that specify on which tags this Access-
Spec is applicable and a set of commands and parameters 
required by the reader to access correctly the various 
memories of the tags. 
 
NB. 
- An “active” ROSpec means the ROSpec is under 
execution. 
- An “active” AccessSpec means the AccessSpec is 
ready for execution (i.e., it is waiting for an active 
ROSpecto trigger it). 
 
LLRP operates as follows. The middleware can define 
and send several ROSpec and AccessSpec (always in 
disabled state) to the reader. Each AccessSpec is af-
fected to one ROSpec that will be responsible of trigger-
ing it. At a given time, only one ROSpec is under execu-
tion. Once some tags are identified by ROSpec and if 
these tags match the triggering conditions specified in 
the TagSpecof an active AccessSpec, this AccessSpec is 
triggered to perform additional operations on the se-
lected tags such as retrieving data from their memories. 
Fig. 3 shows the behavior of a LLRP compliant reader 
“with one ROSpec” in a three-state Finite State Machine 
(FSM).  The transitions in this FSM are labeled “X/Y”, 
where X represents the input of the reader (usually a re-
quest coming from the middleware) and Y is the output 
of the reader (usually a response to the middleware re-
quest). AROSpec moves to “Inactive” state when the 
reader receives an “Enable(ROSpecID)” request, then 
waits for a start condition such as an event from a mo-
tion sensor or simply a request from the middleware, to 
start the inventory process (the ROSpec is then in “Ac-
tive” state). When some tags are identified, the reader 
checks if these tags match any TagSpec of an “Active” 
AccessSpec belonging to the running ROSpec (Access-
Spec moves to “Active” state by “Enable(Access-
SpecID)” request from the middleware). If so, the reader 
performs the specified operations in the AccessSpec on 






















































Fig.3. A three state FSM of a reader 
• The user or enterprise applications are programs that 
use the business events to provide different services for 
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the end-users. The user applications are mainly Enter-
prise Resource Planning (ERP), Supply Chain Manage-
ment (SCM), Warehouse Management Systems (WMS) 
or critical applications such as medical and transporta-
tion applications. 
 
III. RELATED WORK 
 
RFID technology has been developed very rapidly over the 
last decade in many areas through a variety of applica-
tions.This requires a reliable deployment of RFID systems to 
meet user requirements that change over time. Issues related to 
the deployment of this technology rise when the used technol-
ogy is passive RFID that is cheap but error prone; the read rate 
of such systems drops to 60% in presence of more than 5 tags 
[3].This drop in accuracy is due to the tag signal collision. It 
can also be affected in general by environmental factors such 
asthe presence of metal or liquid that reflect or distort the 
radio signal, or the presence of multiple readers (i.e., radio 
wave interference), etc. Moreover, the increase of RFID appli-
cations and RFID sources makes the processing of the gener-
ated amount of data more difficult.   
Several pieces of middleware have emerged to meet these 
RFID issues.WinRFID is a flexible and extensible RFID mid-
dleware developed by WINMEC RFID Lab[10][11]capable of 
processing large amounts of data with real-time error fixing 
and recovering from faults and exceptions. RF²ID for “Relia-
ble Framework for Radio Frequency IDentification”takes into 
consideration the unreliability of the RFID technolo-
gy[12][13]. RF²IDconsiders a mapping of the system (i.e., the 
location of each reader) and manipulates some lists such as 
“observed Tag List” of the current reader, “expected Tag List” 
of the next reader, “missing Tag List”, etc.to detect abnormal 
behaviors of the systemsuch as the disappearance of a 
tag.Fosstrak for “Free and Open Source Software for TRAce 
and tracK” implements the EPCglobalInc.1
                                                          
1EPCglobalInc. specializes in the development of industry-driven standards to 
support the use of RFID [www.epcglobalinc.org]. 
standards. It is 
designed to provide track and trace servicesthat are specific to 
each user or enterprise application[14][15]. Aspire 
RFID[16][17]for “Advanced Sensors and lightweight Pro-
grammable middleware for Innovative RfidEnterprise applica-
tions” is an open source and OSGi based middleware solution. 
It implements several standards such as NFC andEPCglobal 
standards. It provides the main functions of RFID middleware 
such as data filtering and aggregationand it aims to facilitate 
and minimize the cost of deploying RFID technologies[18]. 
Sun RFID middleware is a Java based technology. It is de-
signed to provide reliable integration of RFID technology in 
existing enterprise systems[19]. It is based on the notion of 
“event”; each received informationsuch as “tag ID” is trans-
lated into an event that contains more useful information such 
as “the place where the tag is read”, “the date”, “the reader ID 
that identified the tag”, etc. FlexRFIDis a four-layer based 
architecture; hardware, application, processing and access 
management layers[20][21]. FlexRFID operates as Sun RFID 
middleware with event processing. REFiLL[22]for “RfidEvent 
FiLteringtooLchain”is a flexible solution that gives the user 
the ability to define specific filtering rules for more adaptabili-
ty to its needs. 
The current RFID middlewaresolutionssuch as the ones 
listed above, focusmainly on managing the various data 
sources and processing the large amount of raw data. In return, 
theyneglect or partially consider fault tolerance.The main 
methods used to handle faults incurrent RFID systems are 
Remote Monitoring of the Reader Status and Reader Perfor-
mance Monitoring[7]. The Reader Status Monitoring is per-
formed by a simple query using Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP) such as “ping” to determine whether the 
reader is on and connected to the network or not. The Reader 
Performance Monitoring uses the variation of a given perfor-
mance parameter to detect faulty components. This perfor-
mance parameter can be: 
• Read Error Rate (RER) of a reader [23]: is the number 
of erroneous reads during one inventoryprocess2
• Read Error to Total Reads (RETR) [7]: is the number of 
erroneous reads over the total read attempts of a given 
reader (usually within several inventories). 
. 
• Reading Accuracy or Read Rate: is opposite to RETR; 
i.e., it is the number of times that each tag is seen over 
all reading attempts. 
• Average Tag Traffic Volume[7]: this approach needs a 
learning phase to determine a reference value. This ref-
erence value will be used to detect unusual tag traffic 
that is a possible indication of a faulty system. 
• The profile approach[24]: is a set of read rates asso-
ciated to each detected tag within the same group (e.g., a 
pallet of products) according to a given reader. The or-
dered read rate curve represents the profile of this group 
of tags according to that reader. This approach verifies 
the compliance of a group of tags with its associated 
profile according to a given reader and vice versa (i.e., 
the compliance of a reader with its associated profile ac-
cording to a given group of tags). A couple “group of 
tags and reader”that does not match its associated pro-
file is declared faulty; namely, one or both of them are 
faulty. 
All these monitoring techniques present some lacks i.e., 
poor diagnosis, especially in harsh environments, where fail-
ures come from various causes such as aging effects, medium 
disturbances (e.g., electromagnetic bursts), etc. Indeed, these 
techniques do not have a global vision of the system as they 
monitor one reader at a time.So, when a RFID reader fails to 
read some tags, the aforementioned techniques cannot identify 
the real faulty components;the failure can be caused by a faul-
ty reader3
RFID readers are very similar to distributed multiprocessor 
systems in their behavior. The readers are connected in a logi-
cal path due to the tag dataflow as the processors are con-
, faulty tags or by a faulty air interface such as the 
presence of radio wave interference during the communica-
tion. 
                                                          
2 An inventory is a set of reader operations during which the reader tries to 
identify all tags located in its antenna scope. 
3 A faulty reader can be either a “broken” reader or a very “inaccurate” one 
(e.g., a reader that has a damaged antenna). 
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nected together in a multiprocessor system. In this latter, we 
use the hardware redundancy to monitor the whole system as 
done by D. Fussell and S. Rangarajan in their work onmulti-
processor system diagnosis [25][26]. They used a comparison 
model to process failure probabilities of the proces-
sors.Because of these similarities between both systems, we 
propose asimilar approach that uses reader performance para-
meters to on-line diagnose and monitor the RFID system. The 
proposed approach consists in a probabilistic algorithm that 
compares the performance parameters of the readers in order 
to detect and locate RFID failures.Thisapproach focuses on-
large-scale deploymentsof RFIDtechnologiessuch asairport 
baggage handling systems. The failures that we are interested 
incan be permanent or transient and they range from a broken 
device4
• The appearance or disappearance of a tag or group of 
tags (e.g., a tag that is detected by a reader and not by 
another one). 
 (i.e., broken reader or tag) to a damaged device (e.g., 
damaged antenna) that does not block the Read/Write opera-
tions but affects the reader performances (e.g., this leads to a 
high error frequency or to a low reading accuracy that will be 
less than 60%).When a failure is detected in the system, a 
complementary state verification process is triggered to check 
for the causes of the failure. 
 
IV. FAULT MODEL 
 
A. RFID failures 
 
The failures that we are interested in are the following: 
• The non-response of a reader (e.g., the reader is broken 
down). 
• The low performance of a reader (e.g., one of the reader 
antennas is damaged, radio frequency interference, etc.). 
 
B. How the proposed approach can be used? 
 
The first step of our approach, i.e., the probabilistic algo-
rithm, can be used to analyze the readers one by one or in 
groups in order to detect RFID failures. 
 
B.1 Processingindividual tags 
 
In this case, we are interested in the tag ID that each reader 
identifies and we consider the following situations:  
• Most readers identify correctly the tag; the tag is consi-
dered correct and the readers that do not identify it cor-
rectly are considered faulty. 
• Most readers do not identify correctly the tag; these 
readers are declared:  
- Faulty (even if they represent the majority): if the 
remaining readers (the minority) are more than two 
and they identify the same tag ID.Indeed, the prob-
ability pto have Nfaulty readers (N ≥ 2) that identi-
fy the same tag ID at the same time, knowing that 
                                                          
4 A broken device leads to impossible Tag/Reader communication (No 
read/write operations). 
the size of the tag ID is 96 bits, is very small 
(𝑝𝑝 = 1296  × 𝑁𝑁).  
- Fault-free:in this case,if the minority is less than 
two; i.e., there is only one reader that returns a cor-
rect tag ID (this tag identifier may be just a re-
maining tag ID in the memory of the reader and it 
is probably different from the real one). In this 
case, the tag and the said reader are declared faulty 
and the other readers (the majority) are fault-free. 
The main concern of this approach is that processing the 
tags separately does not allow the detection of the failures 
whose consequences are reduced reading performance of the 
reader; e.g., a damaged antenna of a reader that leads to a 
weak radio signal will not be detected because the reader will 
continue to identify the tags but with a weaker read rate than 









B.2 Processing tag groups 
 
This case istwofold. 
• We can consider the observed tag list of each reader. 
This approach was used in the aforementioned RF²ID 
middleware. It has the same drawbacks than processing 
individual tags. Indeed, it does not detect the failures 
that do not block the Read/Write operations but affect 
the reader performances. 
• We can focuson the variation of a given reader perfor-
mance parameter according to each group of tags. This 
requires a learning phase to determine the reference val-
ue of the chosen performance parameter. Examples of 
reader performance parameters were given in section III. 
- When most readers match the predefined perfor-
mance parameter, the remaining readers are consi-
dered faulty; i.e., the minority that does not match 
the performance parameter is faulty. 
- When most readers do not match the predefined 
parameter, the group of tags and the other readers 
are declared faulty. 
Processing the tags in groups detects more failures (such as 
failures due to reduced reader performance) than monitoring 
the tags separately. However, it cannot locate which tag is 
really faulty in the group and in general, when a failure occurs, 
we cannot say if the failure comes from a faulty reader, faulty 
tags or from environmental disturbances. 
In the rest of this paper, we consider monitoringof tag 
groups with the use of the profile performance parameter. The 
details of theprofile approach can be found in [24]. We will 
focuson the performance result of each reader; i.e., if the read-
er matches its performance profile or not (binary decision). 
60 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS SOFTWARE AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 9, NO. 1, MARCH 2013 





The SafeRFID-MW architecture we propose, takes in con-
sideration the unreliable nature of RFID systems in addition to 
providing the main services of a common RFID middleware. 
This architecture can be represented as a three-layer model as 




A.1Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) 
 
HAL is responsible of interfacing operations with hard-
ware components such as: 
• Unification ofthe waythemiddlewareinteractswith the 
hardware components. 
• Reception of data fromvarioussources, data contro-
landtransmission toData Processing Layer (DPL) or to 
readers. 
 
A.2Data Processing Layer (DPL) 
 
DPL is the main layer of the middleware. It is responsible 
of most functions of the middleware, such as data filtering, 
aggregation, etc. The main sub-components of this layer are: 
• Data Dissemination;responsibleof data diffusion accor-
dingto predefined rules. 
• Data Aggregation;responsibleofcountingand data ag-
gregation according to agiven criterion (sametypeofrea-
deror data intendedforthe sameapplication, etc.). 
• Data Protection; responsible ofprotecting andmanagin-
gapplication accesses todata (i.e., data access restric-
tions) and servicesprovidedby themiddleware. 
• Database Management;responsibleof organizing and 
sharing the processed data. 
• Data Read-
ing/Writing;responsibleofcollectingdatathroughcomman
dsthat it sendstoreaders and fordata writingonthe tag 
memories. 
• Data Transformation; responsible ofprocessingand for-
mattingtheraw datainvariousformatsforgreater flexibili-
ty. 
• Data Filtering;responsibleofremovingunnecessary data. 
• System Diagnosis; responsible of monitoring and diag-
nosing the whole RFID systemthrough some fault-
tolerant approaches that we will discuss later. 
 
A.3Application Abstraction Layer (AAL) 
 
AAL providesuser applications with an interfaceforacces-
singvarious servicesofferedby themiddleware. 
 
B. Fault-tolerance features 
 
SafeRFID-MWwill accommodate two diagnosis mechan-
isms:  Probabilistic Diagnosis Algorithm and Model Based 
Diagnosis that can be used together or separately. The first one 
consists in comparing the read results, more precisely the 
profile of the readers to identify outliers or abnormal behavior 
of RFID devices such as “a reader is not responding”, “a high 
error frequency of a reader”, “some tags are not read”, etc. A 
probability is associated to each identification of an outlier by 
using a probabilistic model. This probability informs the user 
about the accuracyof the diagnosis according to the runtime 
conditions. The second mechanism is a formalization of the 
LLRP protocol as a finite state machine (FSM). This FSM is 
used with usual test sequence generation techniques toidentify 
some failure causes. An extension of this FSM is proposed and 
used in a state verification process to deal with more failures 
and their causes. In the rest of this paper, because of the com-
plexity of both aforementioned diagnosis mechanisms, we will 






VI. RFID DIAGNOSIS ALGORITHM 
 
The proposed probabilistic diagnosis algorithmconsists of 
three steps as shown inFig. 5. The first one is partitioning the 
readers into several groups according to the data flow. The 
second one compares all reader results in the same group to 
identify faulty components (faulty readers or tags). These 
comparisons are based on the variation of the profileparame-
ter.We recall that a profile isan ordered set of read rates of the 
tags of a same group that forms a curved line. If the couple 
(reader, group of tags)closely follows its predetermined profile 
(i.e., the curved line), we consider that this couple matches its 
associated profile and that it is fault-free. Otherwise, the 
couple is declared faulty.The third step estimates the precision 
of the diagnosis. This precision is represented by a probability 
whose calculation will be explained later.In the rest of this 
paper, we refer to the proposed diagnosis algorithm by RFID 
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Fig.5. RFID Diagnosis Algorithm 
 
A. Reader Partitioning 
 
The idea of grouping the readers according to the nature of 
the data flow which is the first step of our approach makes 
sense when the RFID technology is used in big warehouses, 
where the management of product storage is important. Thus, 
each type of the moving items (e.g., pallets) always follows 
the same physical path from an entry point to the designated 
destination in the warehouse. We can also mention airport 
baggage handling systems equipped by the RFID technology. 
All passengers’luggage of the same flight follow the same 
physical path. Thus, we can monitor the readers located in the 
same dataflow path (e.g., luggage of the same flight) together 
in order to detect their failures by RFID diagAlgo. 
 
Fig.6. Grouping of readers according to the data flow 
Fig. 6emphasizes the partitioningof the RFID readers of 
the baggage handling system in groups according to the origin 
and the destination of the tagged items. So, the readers 
{R1,R2,R3,R4,R5} will be analyzed together according to the 
tags that follow the path {B, E}; the readers 
{R1,R2,R3, R4, R6,R7} will be analyzed according to the tags of 
the path {B,C} and so on. 
 
B. Reader Results Comparison (RRC) 
 
The result comparison is the second step of our diagnosis 
algorithm. It consists of comparing the results of all readers 
that have analyzed some tags at a given time. TABLE I shows 
an example of reader results comparison, where readers from 
different paths are analyzed simultaneously to get global and 
consistent diagnosis decisions as some readers may belong to 
different paths.TABLE Iindicates if a given reader Ri matches 
its associated profile (M(Ri, gj) = 1) or not (M(Ri, gj) = 0) 
regarding the group of tags gj. S(gj) indicates which compo-
nent (reader or group of tags) is faulty when analyzing the 
group of tags gj.Ri∈S(gj) if Ri has a result (M(Ri, gj)) different 
from the one of most readers. For example, R2∈S(g2) because 
M(R2,g2) = 1 and all the other readers belonging to the same 
path, i.e. {R1, R3, R4, R5}, have M(Ri, g2) = 0, i∈{1, 3, 4, 5}.  
In addition, g2is indicated asfaulty because of the results of the 
majority of the readers (i.e., if most readers do not match their 
associated profiles according to a group of tags, these tags are 
declared faulty). SF( )indicates which reader is faulty;  
Ri ∈ SF( ), if ∃gj, Ri ∈ S(gj). SF( ) can be adjusted so as to 
minimize false-positives;e.g., a reader Ri will be declared 
faulty only if it has been declared faulty twice according to 
two different groups of tags. So, in this example, R6 andR7 will 
not be declared faulty in SF( ).  
 
TABLE I 
READER RESULTS COMPARISON 
M R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 S(gj) 
g1 1 0 1 1 1 - - {R2} 
g2 0 1 0 0 0 - - {R2, g2} 
g3 1 1 1 1 - 0 0 {R6, R7} 
SF( )  {R2, R6, R7} 
 
At this stage of ouralgorithm, we can determine the proba-
bility of failure of each tag. For example, g2 is analyzed by 
five readers and declared faulty by four of them, so its failure 
probability is 4/5. In addition, the temporary failure probabili-
ty of each reader is statisticallyestimated without taking into 
account the runtime conditions. This failure probability of a 
reader will be refined each time the read results of this reader 
are compared with the ones of the other readers; e.g., R2is 
declared faulty twice after it reads3groups of tags, so, its fail-
ure probability is 2/3.These failure probabilities of the readers 
are used by the Probabilistic Model (cf. section VI.C) to 
process the precision of the diagnosis at that moment. This 
precision of the diagnosis can also be considered as the real 
failure probability of the identified faulty components. 
In the rest of this paper, we take the example of TABLE I 
as a thread of the proposed approachthat we will keep consis-
tent throughout this paper. 
 
C. Probabilistic Model 
 
In this model, a probability is associated to each decision 
about the state of the reader. This probability will give the user 
an indication about the precision of the diagnosis according to 
the current system configuration and the runtime conditions. 
This probability is calculated on the basis of four parameters; 
the values of these four parameters represent the configuration 
of the system at a given time. These parameters are: the failure 
probabilities of each reader processed in Reader Results Com-
parison step, the number of readers, the number of processed 
groups of tags and a particular probability called Rational 
Behavior. Rational Behavior is specific to each reader and 
represents the probability that the existence of a failure in the 
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reader will have visible effects on the system. This parameter 
characterizes especially intermittent faults of each reader 
where the failure appears and disappears according to the 
reader configuration. But it should be noted that the proposed 
probabilistic model takes in consideration all RFID failures; 
intermittent and permanent faults, hardware and software 
faults, internal and external faults (i.e., faults due to environ-
ment disturbances).More details about Rational Behavior 
parameter will be given in section VIII. 
We call the ability to correctly identify the state of the 




Identifiability represents the precision of failure detection; 
i.e., it characterizes the reliability of the diagnosis ofRFID 
diagAlgo. It takes into account the runtime conditions such as 
the number of the identified tags or group of tags, the number 
of readers, the Rational Behavior and the reader failure proba-
bilities computed in RRC. So, the Identifiability is specific to 
each decision that the diagnosis algorithm “RFID diagAlgo” 
makes about the state of each reader/group of tags at a given 
configuration of the system (i.e., according to the values of the 
four parameters of the Identifiability). 
 
RRC aims to identify: 
• a real fault-free reader as fault-free (Correct Negative). 
• a real faulty reader as faulty. In other words, RRC tries 
to avoid the case where a faulty reader is declared fault-
free (False Negative). 
So, the Identifiability depends on these two cases (correct and 




Let n be the number of readers analyzing the groups of 
tags, p the probability of failure of a reader (we have consi-
dered that each reader has the same failure probability for sake 
of readability of the formula below) and C(x, y)the binomial 
coefficient.  
A fault-free reader is identified as such in RRC after 
processing of tgroups of tags if: 
• At least half of all readers are fault-free and their results 
are the same as the one of the reader under analysis. 







• At least half of all readers are faulty, but for each group 
of tags, there are at least half of all readers that correctly 
process this group, and then have the same result than 











whereris the Rational Behavior probability of the read-
er. We recall that it indicates the probability thata faulty 
reader willhave a faulty behavior and willprocess the 
tags incorrectly5
• The reader under analysis processes correctly the 
tgroups of tags. So, it has the behavior of a fault-free 
reader. The probability of this case is represented by the 
following formula: 
.We will see later how this parameter is 
estimated. 
If CN(t, n, p, r) is the probability to have a correct negative, 
then 




A faulty reader will be considered as fault-free after 
processing of tgroups of tags if: 
CN(t, n, p, r) × (1 - r)t          (3) 
• The readerx under analysis processes incorrectly igroups 
of tags (1≤i ≤ t), but for each one of them, there are at 
least half of all readers which are faulty and have the 
same result as the one of x. This case is represented by 














If FN(t, n, p, r) is the probability to have a false negative, then 
FN(t, n, p, r) = (3) + (4) 
                                                          
5 In some cases, a faulty reader will correctly identify the tags in its field of 
view (e.g., the reader has a damaged antenna, but not yet used, the path that 
contains the error in its integrated circuit is not used, etc.). 
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 I(t, n, p, r) = (1 - p) × CN(t, n, p, r) 
        - FN(t, n, p, r)) 
So, the Identifiability is processed as follows 
 
From the formula of the Identifiability, we can see that to 
have a better diagnosis precision, we must reduce theFalse 
Negative parameter and increase the Correct Negative one. 
 
If we commonly calculate the Identifiability of the failure 
of the reader R2 of the previous example ofTABLE I, we pro-
ceed as follows: the number of groups of tags is t = 3, the 
number of readers is n = 7. We recall that for sake of simplici-
ty, the Identifiability formula considers the average failure 
probability of the readers instead of considering the specific 
failure probability of each reader, so, the average failure prob-
ability isp = (0 + 2/3 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 1) / 7 ≈ 0.38 and we 
assume that the Rational Behavior is for exampler = 0.9 (more 
details about how to compute the Rational Behavior are given 
in section VIII). So, the Identifiability will be 
I(3, 7, 0.38, 0.9) ≈ 0.98. 
 
C.2Evaluation of the Identifiability 
 
We have calculated the probability I(t, n, p, r) in different 
configurationsto see how the Identifiabilitybehaves according 
to each one of its parameters. The test scenario is the follow-
ing: p and r get their values in {0, 0.001, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 
0.999, 1};n varies from 2 to20; and finally, the parameter tgets 
its values in {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. 
After the calculation of the Identifiability with the test sce-
nario defined above, we have obtained 6080cases. We can 
summarize the behavior of the Identifiabilityin Fig. 7. 
Fig. 7 (a) shows that the precision of the diagnosis (the 
Identifiability) grows up with increasing number of groups of 
tags t. TheIdentifiability has the same behavior with growing 
values of r. This is consistent, because with a high value of r, 
more faulty readerswill exhibit their failures, and so they will 
be detected. 
In Fig. 7(b), I(t, n, p, r) is increasing with r until it reaches 
its maximum value at r ≅ 0.5. After this, I(t, n, p, r)decreases 
with the increasing of r. With a great value of p(p=0.7), most 
readers will be faulty. When r is small; i.e., the faulty readers 
do not exhibit their failures; namely, they process the tags 
correctly and it is hard to RFID diagAlgo to detect them 
(I(t, n, p, r) is small). The precision of RFID diagAlgo grows 
up with the increasing of the value of r, because there are 
more and more readers that exhibit their failures, and then they 
are diagnosed as faulty ones. But when r becomes greater than 
0.5, the growth of the value of r has the opposite effect on 
I(t, n, p, r); most of the faulty readers make the wrong decision 
(because r > 0.5), and because of the faulty readers represent 
the majority, RFID diagAlgo will consider the readers that 
have made the incorrect result as fault-free ones, and the other 
ones as faulty. It is clear that when r grows up, the number of 
faulty readers that make the wrong decision grows up and the 
number of incorrect analysis on the readers made by RFID 
diagAlgo will increase; i.e., I(t, n, p, r)will decrease. 
 
We can also use this approach to determine how many 
groups of tags the system has to process for a better precision 
in detecting failures. TABLE IIis an example where p = 0.1 
and r = 0.5 that shows the number of groups of tags required 
on the basis of the number of readers present in the RFID 
system. For example, if our system has 5 readers, the precision 
of the algorithm is at its maximum with 9 groups of tags; (i.e., 
I(t, n, p, r) = 0,997426). But we can see that from t = 4, the 
Identifiability is approximately the same as the maximum. For 
purpose of optimization, RFID diagAlgo can take a decision 
just after processing 4 groups of tags, instead of wasting time 
in waiting for other incoming groups of tags. 
 
(a)Identifiability variation according to t 
 
(b) Identifiability variation according to r 
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Fig. 7. Evaluation of the Identifiability 
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TABLE II 
NUMBER OF REQUIRED GROUPS OF TAGS ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER 
OF READERS 
 
As said before, one of our objectives is to reduce the FN 
(False Negative) parameter. We effectively minimize its im-
pact on the precision of the diagnosis ofRFID DiagAlgo.  This 
is made possible with the growing number of readers, and so, 
the precision of failure detection increases. Fig. 7 (c)shows 
that while the number of readers is increasing, FN decreases to 
reach a very small value atn = 10.Fig. 7 (c) is another example 
that shows how we can use this approach in real RFID systems 
to process the best value of one parameter of the Identifiabili-
tyknowing the three other ones to have a few false negatives; 
e.g., if a RFID system has the same configurationas in Fig. 7 
(c) (i.e., t = 5, p = 0.3 and r = 0.9), we will set the size of each 
group of readers to analyze together to 10 to have a very accu-
rate diagnosis. 
In the remaining sections, a complementary diagnosis ap-
proach is presented to allow a precise location and identifica-
tion of the causes of the identified failures. 
 
VII. MODEL BASED DIAGNOSIS 
 
This approach is based on LLRP, the communication stan-
dard between RFID readers and RFID middleware to monitor 
the behavior of the readers. In this approach, we propose to 
extend the LLRP protocol to make it able to handle RFID fail-
ures. Indeed, LLRP is a complex and complete communication 
protocol with error notifications, but it is not able to detect 
misconfiguration errors neither to locate the origin and the 
causes of the failures.LLRP is very flexible and gives the user 
the full power in the definition of the Reader Operation and 
Tag Memory Access specifications. But this usually leads to 
misconfiguration errors such as “the user has activated the 
wrong ROSpec”, “the AccessSpec is not linked with the right 
ROSpec”, etc.  Effects of this kind of errors can be “the reader 
does not identify all tags located in its field of view”, “the 
reader does not retrieve the needed information from the tag 
memories”, etc.In the subsequent sections, we will show how 
to deal with this kind of failures with our proposed LLRP ex-
tension. 
 
A. LLRP failures 
 
We refine the RFID failures presented earlier (cf. sec-
tion IV)and classify them according to their causes into two 
categories as follows: 
A.1Failures due to inconsistent design or misconfiguration 
 
• Masking of useful data or even blocking all data by the 
middleware. 
• Mismatch between the received and the expected data 
by the middleware or the reader. 
 
A.2Failures due to runtime conditions 
 
• Slow execution / component overload. 
• No data capture. 
• Erroneous received data. 
 
B. Failure Processing 
 
As said before, RFID readers are inherently inaccurate. 
This usually leads to the transmission of erroneous data to the 
RFID middleware. The proposedsolution to deal with the 
aforementioned failures consists of two mechanisms. The first 
one uses a state verification process using the existing LLRP 
model to deal with the failures due to inconsistent design and 
misconfiguration. The second one extends the LLRP model to 
deal with the failures not covered by the first mechanism (i.e., 
failures due to runtime conditions). 
 
B.1Using the existing LLRP model 
 
Failures due to inconsistent design or misconfiguration are 
caused by the fact that one of the participants (middleware or 
reader) in the communication is in the wrong state; i.e., the 
middleware (or the reader) is in a state where it does not ex-
pect the received commands or data. Then, as a consequence, 
although they are useful data, they will be ignored and an error 
message may be returned. For example, let us assume that a 
reader is in a state where the ROSpec is disabled instead of 
being inactive (the user omits to enable the ROSpec or the 
reader does not interpret correctly the “Enable” request of the 
middleware). So, when some tags enter in the field of view of 
the reader, the motion sensor sends a signal to the reader in 
order to start the tag inventory. But, this signal is just ignored 











Fig.8. Arbitrary three-state FSM 
This kind of failures is handled without any need to extend 
the existing LLRP model. All we have done is translating the 
textual specification of LLRP protocol into a finite state ma-
chine (FSM). This LLRP FSM is used with usual test se-
quence generation techniques (“Distinguishing Sequences”) to 
deal with these failures. A distinguishing sequence is a set of 
transitions that allow identifying the initial and current state of 
the reader or the middleware[27]. This is useful to deduce the 
exact configuration of the reader (i.e., number of ROSpec and 
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AccessSpec, the state of each one of them, which AccessSpec 
belongs to which ROSpec, etc.) when the failure occurs. This 
FSM consists in 18 states and more than 200 transitions. For 
sake of simplicity, we will only show how to exploit the Dis-
tinguishing Sequence technique in an example to identify the 
failure causes. So, let us take a simple FSM such as the one in 
Fig. 8. To identify the state of the reader or the middleware 
when the failure occurs, we construct the successor tree of this 
FSM. A successor tree shows the behavior of an FSM starting 
from all possible states under all possible input sequences. 
Fig. 9shows an example of a successor tree built up from 
the FSM of Fig. 8. It shows the transition sequences that dis-
tinguish between the different states of the FSM. When a fail-
ure occurs, the FSM can be in any state. So, the objective is to 
identify this state.  
In this successor tree, the input B separates the state S1from 
S2 and S3; i.e., if we have an output “0” (resp., “1”) after ap-
plying the input B, we are sure that the current state of the 
FSM is S1 (resp., S2 or S3). Then, the input A separates the 
state S2 from S3. At the end of this state verification process, if 
we have a sequence such as {B/1, A/0}, then, we are sure that 
the current state of the FSM is S3 and the initial state at the 
launch of this verification process is S2, i.e., the unique state 
from which the sequence {B/1, A/0} is possible. So, the se-
quence {B/1, A/0} is a distinguishing sequence of the state S2. 
Other examples of distinguishing sequences are: {A/1} for S2, 



























Fig. 9. The successor tree of the arbitrary FSM 
 
Now, let us see how to use this technique in a real case. 
For instance, returning to the previous example of TABLE I, if 
the failure is a “tag inventory” problem, this technique can 
indicate if the problem comes from the following misconfigu-
ration errors: “the user or SafeRFID-MW has activated the 
wrong ROSpec on R2”,“the ROSpec specifies the wrong read-
er antenna”, etc. If the failure is a “tag memory access” prob-
lem such as “Masking of useful data by the reader” (e.g., the 
middleware receives only the tag identifiers but not their 
memory contents), SafeRFID-MWsends to the reader specific 
commands using the distinguishing sequence technique to 
check if this error is due to a wrong internal state of the reader; 
i.e., the AccessSpec is not executed to access the tag memo-
ries. At the end of the diagnosis, we deduce that the reader’s 
initial state was one of the following, which is the cause of the 
failure. 
• Case 1: ROSpec is “Active” but not the AccessSpec. 
• Case 2: ROSpec and AccessSpec are “Active” but the 
AccessSpec is not in the list of AccessSpec to be trig-
gered by the running ROSpec. 
• Case 3: ROSpec and AccessSpec are “Active” but the 
identified tags do not satisfy the triggering conditions of 
the AccessSpec. 
 
If it turns out that the causes of the failure does not come 
from misconfiguration errors, the proposed LLRP extension 
comes in to check the runtime conditions in order to identify 




B.2Extending the LLRP model 
 
In this step, we propose to extend the LLRP model to han-
dle the failures caused by the runtime conditions. 
 
1) Slow execution / Component overload 
 
These failures may be caused by the amount of raw data to 
process that leads the middleware to slow down. We should 
know that SafeRFID-MW associates to each new reader an 
instance of the LLRP FSM to permanently maintain consistent 
communications with it. So, to check that the source of this 
problem comes from the huge amount of data that are fed back 
to it, SafeRFID-MW needs just to read all the instances of 
LLRP FSM looking for all the readers that are in “communi-
cating state”. Then, it only remains to verify that the number 
of the current communicating readers does not exceed its ca-
pacity. If it does, as a possible solution, SafeRFID-MW will 
ask the readers that have internal memory to stop the data 
transfer and to temporary store the data in their memories. 
 
2) No data capture / erroneous received data 
 
These failures are also caused by inconsistent design and 
misconfiguration, but they may also be caused by: 
• The reader antenna is damaged or broken. 
• The tags are out of the reader field of view or the signal 
power level of the reader is too weak. 
• The tags move too fast. So, the reader has not enough 
time to identify all tags. 
• The tags are not supported by the reader or on the con-
trary, the selected air protocol is not supported by the 
tags. 
• The presence of external disturbances (radio waves of 




Fig. 10emphasizes the LLRP extension. The lozenges in 
the diagram represent the inputs in the FSM, and the leaves 
(the circular shapes) are the causes of the failure. 
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RO = Act & 
Access = Act























































Fig.10. LLRP failure diagnosis diagram 
 
As we can see in Fig. 10, when the reader is executing 
aROSpec with an AccessSpec (ROSpec and AccessSpec are 
active), SafeRFID-MW may ask for the result of these specifi-
cations. If the report is incomplete (e.g., there are tags that are 
not inventoried correctly, impossible read/write of tag memo-
ries, etc.), SafeRFID-MW triggers the diagnosis process. The 
failure causes are hierarchically sorted according to their diag-
nosis difficulties. So a “broken antenna” is easier to diagnose 
than a “faulty communication link” as we will see below: 
• SafeRFID-MW can verify if an antenna is damaged or 
broken by asking the reader to give it back the number 
of “operational” antennas. If the reader is not able to 
perform this action and knowing that most readers have 
at least two antennas (one for transmission and one for 
reception), SafeRFID-MW can transmit a signal by an 
antenna to receive it by the other one. If this operation 
succeeds, we assume that the antennas are not broken. 
To verify if one of them is damaged, SafeRFID-MW 
will vary the receive sensitivity6
• For the second cause of failure (i.e., “the tags are out of 
the scope of the antenna”), SafeRFID-MW will locate 
the tags by varying the power level or the receive sensi-
tivity of the antenna as explained above. 
 or the signal power 
level of the antenna to determine the communication 
scope of the antenna as a damaged antenna will cover a 
smaller area. So, it is possible to deduce if the antenna is 
damaged or not (the distance between the antennas must 
be known). 
Fig. 11shows 
an area containing four readers, and how to exactly lo-
cate a tag to verify if it is out of the scope of a reader. 
For example, when the tag or group of tags T2 is not 
                                                          
6 Receive sensitivity indicates how faint a radio frequency signal can be 
successfully received by a given receiver. The lower the power level that the 
receiver can successfully process, the better the receive sensitivity [30]. 
identified correctly by the reader R1 while it should be, 
the SafeRFID-MW will exploit the neighbors of R1 to 
locate T2 by reducing the scope of these readers enough 












Scopes of R2 
according to its 
signal power level  
Fig.11. Tag localization technique 
• To deduce that the failure is due to tags that move too 
fast, the middleware can proceed as follows: 
- If the tags are carried by a conveyor belt, SafeR-
FID-MW has just to know the speed of the con-
veyor belt and to compare it with the maximum 
speed supported by the reader. 
- The second possibility is to calculate the speed of 
the tagged item using its two previous positions (or 
three, to calculate the tag speeding), also by using 
the neighbors of the reader under analysis. 
• Todetect the failure of the communication link, we pro-
ceed as follows: 
- If erroneous data are received by the middleware-
SafeRFID-MW, thenwe are sure that the problem 
comes from the communication link between the 
reader and SafeRFID-MW; otherwise the errone-
ous data will be filtered by the reader.  
- To deduce the causes of the problem when it 
comes from the communication link between the 
reader and the tags, SafeRFID-MW will ask the 
neighbors of the concerned reader which air proto-
col they use to successfully identify the tags. So, 
SafeRFID-MW can deduce that the reader has used 
a non-supported protocol. Otherwise it will check 
if the reader does not support the concerned tags 
(e.g., UHF reader that try to read HF tags) always 
by asking its neighbors.  
• If none of these causes are found, we assume that the 
failure is due to external disturbances such as the pres-
ence of metal objects between the reader and the tags. 
 
VIII. RFID DIAGALGO IMPLEMENTATIONS 
 
We have already seen that Identifiability depends on four 
parameters. As mentioned before, The Rational Behavior is 
specific to each reader and concerns only its failures (e.g., 
damaged antenna, errors in the reader software, etc.).A possi-
ble way for processing the Rational Behaviorcan be by 
processing the number of execution paths (hardware and soft-
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ware paths); e.g., Fig. 12shows an example of a control flow 
graph (side b) according to the program of side (a) that we can 
use to process the parameter r. In this case, we have (N = 4) 
possible execution paths. By using the Halstead measures7
 
, we 
can estimate the number (A) of errors in the program that will 
have visible effects on the system[28]. So, the Rational Beha-
vior in this example will be r = A/N. 
 
Fig.12. Control flow graph 
The same approach can be used to compute the Rational 
Behavior of a reader. This case requires taking into considera-
tion the reliability of the hardware components. So, we need 
the following elements to estimate the reader’sRational Beha-
vior: 
- The number of software failures that have visible effects 
on the system (Halstead measures). 
- The number of hardware failures that have visible effects 
on the system;it can be computed by performing a Fail-
ure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) on the reader such 
as the one proposed in [29]. 
- The number of software execution paths;it can be com-
putedby using the source code of the software. 
- The number of Hardware execution paths; it can be de-
termined by using the electronic circuit diagram of the 
reader. 
In a real world deployment, RFID readersare usually black 
boxes (i.e., we do not have access to their architecture details); 
so the processing of the Rational Behavior parameter is im-
possible.In such cases, we will take in consideration only the 
failures that have observable effects on the system (i.e., no 
silent errors). This means thatr will have a great value such as 
0,999 or 1; this means that when a failure occurs, its effect will 
be observable on the system. 
RFID diagAlgoworks as follows. After the reader partition-
ing phase, itproceeds to the verification of the state of the 
reader under analysis. Then, it verifies the state of the current 
group of tags once the monitored reader is declared fault-free. 
This algorithm has a complexity of O(t × n2) and is presented 
in the annex A. We have deliberately chosen this representa-
tion without optimization for sake of simplicity. For informa-
                                                          
7 The Halstead  measures  introduced by Maurice Howard Halstead in 1977 
are functions of  the  number  of  operators  and operands  in  the  program to 
estimate the number of errors in an implementation. 
tion, the execution time ofRFID diagAlgoonce it gets all read-
er results does not exceed 20milliseconds8
In this implementation, the middleware analyzes 5 readers 
at a time as in the second implementation. The difference 
between these implementations lies in the selection of the five 
readers to be analyzed. Indeed, in this approach, the progress 
speed of the Moving Window varies according to the analyzed 
readers at each step. When the readers are analyzed by the 
middleware, the faulty ones are ejected from the window, and 
the same number of readers is added (from the remaining 
readers in the path) to the moving window. If all readers of the 
window are fault-free, only the first reader in the window is 
ejected as shown in
. 
We have implemented RFID diagAlgo in several ways. 
Each one will be discussed to show its advantages and disad-
vantages. The main implementation is to analyze all reader 
results together at one time. But because of slowness of this 
approach, we looked for other alternative implementations. So, 
the second proposed implementation is to analyze the readers 
in disjoint subgroups of 5 readers. The last implementation is 
to analyze the readers as the reader results arrive. This ap-
proach can be seen as a moving window that moves along the 
set of the readers. 
 
A. Calculation done at the end 
 
In this implementation, the middleware starts the process 
of analyzing the RFID data once it has all the reader results. 
This is interesting regarding the precision of the diagnosis but 
it takes much time (indeed the middleware waits until all tags 
are read by all readers in the path of these tags). Thiswaiting 
period isinthe range of secondsor evenminuteswhile the execu-
tion timeof the diagnosis process when the reader results are 
available isin the order ofmilliseconds. For this reason, we 
propose two alternative implementations that are much faster 
and we will discuss later how reliable (in terms of diagnosis 
precision) they are compared to the main implementation (i.e., 
Calculation done at the end). 
 
B. Alternative implementations 
 
B.1 Calculation done five by five 
 
In this implementation, the middleware starts the diagnosis 
process every time it has the results of 5 readers. When the 
five readers are analyzed by the middleware, it moves to the 
five next readers, and so on. We have set the size of the reader 
group underanalysis to five, because, with five readers, the 
middleware has enough data to perform mostly a correct diag-




B.2 Moving window implementation 
 
Fig. 13. 
                                                          
8RFID diagAlgois tested on an Intel® Core™ i5 processor-based machine. 
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Both alternative implementations are much faster than the 
original one (i.e., Calculation done at the end). The speed of 
the original implementation depends on the number of groups 
of tags (tagged items), the number of readers in the system and 
the time that the tagged items take to reach each reader. The 
processing time of each implementation is negligible com-
pared to the required time to have the results of all readers 
(i.e., few millisecondsagainst several minutes). So, the main 
challenge here is to show that the alternative implementations 
are reliable enough (in addition to their speed). 
To evaluate these alternative implementations, we have 
compared their accuracy and their detection rate with those of 
the original implementation in three different scenarios. Each 
scenario has 44test cases for a total of 923 readers to diagnose. 
The number of the participating readers in each test case varies 
from3 to 60 readers and the number of groups of tags varies 
from 2 to 6 groups.A test case is implemented as a matrix 
(readers, groups of tags) as shown onTABLE I. 
Each line of the test matrix represents the results of one 
reader. We recall that when Ri(gj) = 1 (resp.,Ri(gj) = 0), the 
couple (Ri, gj) matches its associated profile;i.e., the reader 
Ridoes not exceed the limit of the predetermined profile para-
meter according to the group gj(resp.,does not match its profile 
and this can be caused by a faulty reader or a faulty group of 
tags). 
A reader is considered faulty if it exceeds the limit of the 
performance parameter at least one time. The process of veri-
fying if a reader exceeds or not the performance parameter 
limit is performed by another program that is not presented 
here. 
TABLE III 
SAMPLE DIAGNOSIS RESULT 
 
TABLE IIIshows a sample diagnosis resultperformed by 
all three implementations on the example of TABLE I as a 
three-column table. This table contains the failure probabilities 
of the faulty readers according to test matrix of TABLE I. 
TABLE IIIshows also the processing time of each proposed 
implementation. 
 
C.1 Scenario 1 
 
This case represents a simulation of a little disturbed envi-
ronment (with 44 test matrices) that has a majority of fault-
free readers (665 fault-free readers against 258faulty ones). 
The result of this simulation is shown in Fig. 14. 
• Correct Negative:Fault-free reader is considered as 
such. 
• Correct Positive: Faulty reader is detected. 
• False Negative: Faulty reader is not detected 








C.2 Scenario 2 
 
This case represents a simulation of an intermediate dis-
turbed environment that has nearly the same number of fault-
free readers (468 fault-free readers) as faulty ones (455 faulty 
readers). The result is shown in Fig. 15. 
 
C.3 Scenario 3 
 
This case represents a simulation of a highly disturbed en-
vironment that has a majority of faulty readers (508 faulty 
readers against 415 fault-free ones). The result of this simula-
tion is shown in Fig. 16. 
 
(a) Moving Window Diagnosis 
 
(b) Calculation done 5 by 5 diagnosis 
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 Fig.15. Scenario 2 
 
 
Fig.16. Scenario 3 
All these figures show the same trend. The moving win-
dow approach detects more failures than the calculation done5 
by 5 approach regardless the execution environment. But also 
it generates more false alarms (i.e., false positive). In addition, 
the Moving Window approach is faster than the calculation 
done five by fiveapproach because after the first position of the 
window, the middleware has just to wait for the results of 
usually one next reader to include it in the next window rather 
than five next readers for the second implementation. 
The only cases where the Moving Window approach is in-
efficient are when there are at least three faulty readers in the 
same window at the beginning of the diagnosis process. This 
will distort all the diagnosis. Indeed, the faulty readers consti-
tute the majority. So, the real fault-free readers will be consi-
dered as faulty each time and ejected from the moving win-
dow. 
So, the choice between these implementations depends on 
the dependability policy adopted by the end-user; if he wants 
to detect the RFID components failure as soon as possible, 
with a maximum failure detection rate, the MovingWindow 
implementation is the best, if he wants a diagnosis mechanism 
that gives fewer false alarms and that works in a reasonable 
time, the Calculation done 5 by 5 approach is better, and final-
ly, if he wants to have a more reliable diagnosis even if it takes 





We have presented in this paper a probabilistic diagnosis 
approach based on a statistical analysis to monitor the readers 
and tags in a RFID system. It consists of three steps. The first 
one is the calculation of the neighbors of each reader accord-
ing to the analyzed tags. The second step is the comparison of 
all results of all readers, and then in the third step, once a faul-
ty reader or tag is identified, the proposed approach will asso-
ciate to this decision a probability called Identifiability that 
takes in consideration the runtime conditions. After that, we 
have presented a state verification mechanism based on an 
extension of the communication standard between RFID read-
ers and middleware to refine the diagnosis. Finally, we have 
presented three different implementations of the probabilistic 
diagnosis, and we have shown which one is better according to 





[1]  P. Krishna and D. Husak, "RFID INFRASTRUCTURE," IEEE 
Communications Magazine, vol. 45, no. 9, pp. 4-10, September 
2007.  
[2]  S. R. Jeffery, M. Garofalakis and M. J. Franklin, "Adaptive 
cleaning for RFID data streams," in Proceedings of the 32nd 
international conference on Very large data bases, Seoul, 
Korea, 2006.  
[3]  R. Derakhshan, M. E. Orlowska and X. Li, "RFID Data 
Management: Challenges and Opportunities," IEEE 
International Conference on RFID, pp. 175-182, 2007.  
[4]  L. Catarinucci, R. Colella, M. De Blasi, L. Patrono and L. 
Tarricone, "Experimental Performance Evaluation of Passive 
UHF RFID Tags in Electromagnetically Critical Supply 
Chains," Journal of Communications Software and Systems, 
vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 59-70, 2011.  
[5]  L. Catarinucci, R. Colella and L. Patrono, "On the use of 
passive UHF RFID tags in the pharmaceutical supply chain: a 
 
(a) Moving Window Diagnosis 
 
 (b) Calculation done 5 by 5 diagnosis 
 
 
(a) Moving Window Diagnosis 
 
(b) Calculation done 5 by 5 diagnosis 
 
70 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS SOFTWARE AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 9, NO. 1, MARCH 2013 
novel enhanced tag versus hi-performance commercial tags," 
International Journal of Radio Frequency Identification 
Technology and Applications (IJRFITA), vol. 4, no. 2, 2013.  
[6]  L. Yang, J. Cao, W. Zhu and S. Tang, "A Hybrid Method for 
achieving High Accuracy and Efficiency in Object Tracking 
using Passive RFID," in IEEE International Conference on 
Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom), Lugano, 
pp. 109-115, March 2012.  
[7]  P. Sanghera, F. Thornton, B. Haines, F. Kung Man Fung, J. 
Kleinschmidt, A. M. Das, H. Bhargava and A. Campbell, How 
to Cheat at Deploying and Securing RFID, Massachusetts, 
USA: Syngress Publishing, Inc., Elsevier, Inc., 2007.  
[8]  R. Kheddam, O.-E.-K. Aktouf and I. Parissis, "Online 
monitoring and diagnosis of RFID readers and tags," in 20th 
IEEE International Conference on Software, 
Telecommunications and Computer Networks, Split, Croatia, 
2012.  
[9]  T. Hassan and S. Chatterjee, "A Taxonomy for RFID," IEEE 
39th International Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii, 
2006. 
[10]  UCLA WINMEC, "RFID@WINMEC - RFID Research," 
2005. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.winmec.ucla.edu/rfid/winrfid. 
[11]  B. S. Prabhu, X. Su, H. Ramamurthy, h.-C. Chu and R. Gadh, 
"WinRFID – A Middleware for the enablement of Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) based Applications," in 
Mobile, Wireless and Sensor Networks: Technology, 
Applications and Future, pp. 331-336, 2005.  
[12]  N. Ahmed, R. Kuma, R. S. French and U. Ramachandran, 
"RF²ID: A Reliable Middleware Framework for RFID 
Deployment," in International IEEE Parallel and Distributed 
Processing Symposium, Long Beach, CA, March 2007.  
[13]  N. Ahmed, "Reliable Framework for Unreliable RFID 
Devices," 8th IEEE International Conference on Pervasive 
Computing and Communications Workshops (PERCOM 
Workshops), Mannheim, 2010. 
[14]  C. Floerkemeier, M. Lampe and C. Roduner, "Facilitating 
RFID Development with the Accada Prototyping Platform," in 
Fifth Annual IEEE International Conference on Pervasive 
Computing and Communications Workshops. PerCom 
Workshops '07., Zurich, Switzerland, 2007.  
[15]  C. Floerkemeier, C. Roduner and M. Lampe, "RFID 
Application Development With the Accada Middleware 
Platform," IEEE Systems Journal, pp. 1-13, 2007.  
[16]  ASPIRE Project, "ASPIRE - The EU funded project that brings 
RFID to SMEs," 2009. [Online]. Available: http://www.fp7-
aspire.eu. 




[18]  J. Soldatos, "AspireRFID Can Lower Deployment Costs," 16 
Mars 2009. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/4661. 
[19]  A. Gupta and M. Srivastava, "Developing Auto-ID Solutions 




[20]  M. E. Ajana, H. Harroud, M. Boulmalf and H. Hamam, 
"FlexRFID: A Flexible Middleware for RFID Applications 
Development," IEEE Press, IFIP International Conference on 
Wireless and Optical Communications Networks, WOCN '09., 
Cairo, Egypt, 2009. 
[21]  A. Sengupta and S. Z. Schiller, "FlexRFID: A design, 
development and deployment framework for RFID-based 
business applications," Information Systems Frontiers, vol. 12, 
no. 5, pp. 551-562, November 2010.  
[22]  A. P. Anagnostopoulos, J. K. Soldatos and S. G. Michalakos, 
"REFiLL: A lightweight programmable middleware platform 
for cost effective RFID application development," Pervasive 
and Mobile Computing, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 49-63, February 2009.  
[23]  G. Fritz, V. Beroulle, O.-E.-K. Aktouf, M.-D. Nguyen and D. 
Hély, "RFID system on-line testing based on the evaluation of 
the tags Read-Error-Rate," IEEE, Mixed-Signals, Sensors and 
Systems Test Workshop, pp. 1-10, 2010.  
[24]  G. Fritz, B. Maaloul, V. Beroulle, O.-E.-K. Aktouf and D. 
Hély, "Read rate profile monitoring for defect detection in 
RFID Systems," in IEEE RFID-Technologies and Applications 
(RFID-TA), 2011.  
[25]  S. Rangarajan and D. Fussell, "A Probabilistic Method for 
Fault Diagnosis of Multiprocessor Systems," in IEEE 18th 
International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing, 
Tokyo, Japan, 1988.  
[26]  D. Fussell and S. Rangarajan, "Probabilistic diagnosis of 
multiprocessor systems with arbitrary connectivity," in IEEE 
19th International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing, 
FTCS-19. Digest of Papers., Chicago, IL, pp. 560-565, 1989.  
[27]  D. Lee and M. Yannakakis, "Principles and Methods of Testing 
Finite State Machines - A Survey," Proceedings of the IEEE, 
vol. 84, no. 8, pp. 1090-1123, 1996.  
KHEDDAM et al.:SAFERFID-MW: A MIDDLEWARE WITH RUNTIME FAULT DIAGNOSIS 71
[28]  J. P. Kearney, R. L. Sedlmeyer, W. B. Thompson and M. A. 
Gray, "Software complexity measurement," journal of 
Commun. ACM, vol. 29, no. 11, pp. 1044-1050, Nov. 1986.  
[29]  G. Fritz, V. Beroulle, O.-E.-K. Aktouf, M. D. Nguyen and D. 
Hély, “RFID System On-line Testing Based on the Evaluation 
of the Tags Read-Error-Rate,” Journal of Electronic Testing, 
SpringerLink, June 2011.  
[30]  D. A. Westott, D. D. Coleman, P. Mackenzie and B. Miller, 
CWAP - Certified Wireless Analysis Professional Official 
Study Guide: Exam PW0-270, Indianapolis, Indiana: Wiley 
publishing Inc., 2011.  
Rafik Kheddam obtained his engineering 
degree (in “Advanced Information Systems 
and Software Engineering”) in 2009 from 
UMMTO university in Algeria and a Master 
degree of “Safety and Security Software” in 
2010 from Faculty of Science and Technology 
of Besançon, France.Since December 2010, he 
is a PhD student at the MSTII Doctoral School 
and CTSYS team member of LCIS laboratory 
/ teacher at the Grenoble Institute of Technology, Esisar.  His re-
search interests in LCIS laboratory concern the definition of soft-
ware fault-tolerance and on-line testing mechanisms for RFID sys-
tems. 
Oum-El-Kheir Aktouf has been as an Assis-
tant Professor with Grenoble Institute of 
Technology, Esisar Engineering School and 
LCIS laboratory, since 1999. Her research 
interests concern dependability of embedded 
systems, especially sensor-based systems and 
RFID systems, using on line tests and diagno-
sis approaches.  Her teaching activities con-
cern operating systems, real time systems, 
distributed computing and computing sys-
tems’ dependability. She obtained her Phd degree from GrenobleIns-




Ioannis Parissis is Full Professor at Grenoble 
INP and member of the LCIS laboratory since 
2008. He was an Assistant Professor at Un-
iversité Joseph Fourier, Grenoble, France, 
from 1999 to 2008. His research interests are 
related to software engineering and, more 
specifically, to validation and verification 
issues. His main research interests are auto-
mated test generation from formal specifica-
tions, testing techniques for embedded synchronous programs, test 
coverage criteria for dataflow programs as well as test modeling and 












72 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS SOFTWARE AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 9, NO. 1, MARCH 2013 
ANNEX A   Probabilistic Diagnosis Algorithm (RFID diagAlgo) 
 
Inputs: Read results of each reader. 
Outputs: Failure probabilities of each faulty reader and / or groups of tags. 
 // R is a set of readers to be analyzed by the algorithm. 
 // G is a set of groups of tags processed by R. 
1 begin 
2  n = |R|;t = |G|; 
3  FT ≔ ∅;// The set of Faulty Tags or groups of tags. 
4  FR ≔ ∅;// The set of Faulty Readers. 
5  T[n] ≔ {0, 0, …, 0};// T[u]: number of groups of tags read by reader u. 
6  r ≔ 0.99;// Most failures of the faulty readers have visible effects on the system.  
7  nbFailR[n] ≔ {0, 0, …, 0};// Failure counters for each reader, (array of n counters). 
8  nbFailT[t] ≔ {0, 0, …, 0};// Failure counters for each group of tags, (array of t counters). 
9  failureProba[n] = {0, 0, …, 0};// Failure probabilities of all readers. 
10  x ≔ 0;// number of groups of tags already processed. 
11  
12  for (g ∈ G){ 
13   x++; 
14   for(u ∈ Rg) { // Rgis the set of readers that process the group g with Rg ⊂ R. 
15 computeProfile(u,g); // The profile approach is the chosen performance parameter, 
16 // (see section III for more information). 
17 T[u] ≔ T[u] + 1;// Counting the number of groups of tags processed by u. 
18 if(Du(g) = 0) { 
19 // Du(g)=0 means “g does not match its original profile according to the reader u”. 
20 nbFailT[g] ≔ nbFailT[g] + 1;// number of times g is declared faulty. 
21                       }  
22  } 
23  compute(S(g)) ;  // S(g) contains the faulty components (faulty readers and/or tags). 
24  for (𝑢𝑢 ∈ 𝑅𝑅) { 
25  if (u ∈ S(g)) { // u is faulty on g. 
26 nbFailR[u] ≔ nbFailR[u] + 1; 
27                                   failureProba[u]≔ nbFailR[u] ⁄ T[u] ; 
28  } 
29  } 
30  if (g ∈ S(g)) {  // g is a faulty group. 
31 FT ≔ FT ∪ {g}; 
32 print("g is faulty with a probability”, nbFailT[g] ⁄ (n × I(n, x, failureProba, r))); 
33  } 
34  } 
35  compute(SF); // SF contains the real faulty readers. 
36  for (u ∈ SF) {  
37 FR ≔ FR ∪ {u}; 
38 print("u is faulty with a probability”,I(n, t, failureProba, r)); 
39  }          
40 end 
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